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Knowledge may be embodied tacitly in the
experience of an organisation’s members, as
well as explicitly in its files and records. This
paper compares the knowledge management
tasks facing government and non-
government organisations in the field of anti-
corruption. The prevention of corruption has
become an important part of the Australian
aid program. Aid officials have become
involved in the transfer of knowledge about
corruption, including knowledge held by
domestic anti-corruption agencies, such as
the New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), and
knowledge generated by non-government
organisations like Transparency International.
Government and non-government organis-
ations may need to manage their stocks of
knowledge differently, but both face problems
of deciding whether their knowledge is true
or false.
When Transparency International’s
founders went to the Ford Foundation for
funding they were asked ‘where is your
intellectual capital?’, that is, what was the
store of knowledge on which their arguments
against corruption were drawn. They
scrambled to assemble it, particularly the
Transparency International Source Book
(authored by Jeremy Pope) and the contro-
versial corruption perceptions index (devised
by Johan Lambsdorff). Now Transparency
International’s website provides a vast menu
of toolkits, lessons learned and best practices
in dealing with corruption. It is drawn on by
aid donors, among others, as they develop
strategies to prevent corruption. One of
Transparency International’s founders,
Fredrik Galtung sees ‘knowledge manage-
ment’ as one of the organisation’s critical tasks.
Knowledge management is an issue, in
a different way, for official anti-corruption
agencies. Knowledge is embodied in the
professional expertise of investigators, or the
experience of managers. Data and information
are stored in files and emails. An Independent
Commission Against Corruption is typically
divided into three prongs: investigation,
prevention and education. Each relies on
different professional skills, and plays
different role in relation to knowledge.
Investigation is typically a process of
discovery—looking for new patterns in
existing information, gathering new
information, testing out explanations, and
turning the results into a story that will
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convince a court or tribunal. Corruption
typically takes place in secret, so investig-
ation may require special techniques like
hidden cameras or microphones.
Prevention asks slightly different
questions about the information thrown up
by investigations, and has a different
audience. It looks at how a particular act, or
type of act, might have been prevented, and
turns the results into a story that will
convince a public service manager to change
their procedures. Prevention may draw on
the same store of information as invest-
igations, but may also look in social science
journals, or to try to link its knowledge to other
arguments for reform in the public service.
Education has a third take on the know-
ledge stored in the ICAC. It must reframe and
represent it to specific, different audiences:
public servants, potential whistleblowers,
members of the public, or schoolchildren. The
ICAC’s press office also plays an important
part in managing knowledge about
investigations through the media.
Knowledge management is also an issue
in an ICAC’s relationship with other
government agencies. How and how much
should it share and trade information with
the police or other security agencies? Issues
of security and privacy may serve to limit the
flow of information, and hence the possibility
of knowledge. It is also accountable to other
actors and agencies. It must keep information
that an auditor may request, some time in
the future. It must transform its information
about cases into statistical data to include in
future reports to the legislature.
This paper is intended to introduce a
discussion of knowledge management,
transfer and research for government and
non-government agencies dealing with
corruption. The prevention of corruption has
become an important part of the Australian
aid program. Aid officials have become
involved in the transfer of knowledge about
corruption, including knowledge held by
domestic anti-corruption agencies, such as
the New South Wales’ ICAC, and knowledge
generated by non-government organisations
such as Transparency International.
The paper draws on several literature
reviews and Bryane Michael’s recent writing
on anti-corruption campaigns. The paper also
draws on my own experience of these non-
government organisations, anti-corruption
agencies and academic relationships in
several overlapping contexts. I have been
running a training course with the Corruption
Prevention branch of the NSW ICAC since
1997. This involves considering what counted
as useful knowledge for officials in anti-
corruption agencies from a wide range of
countries, and how the knowledge students
bring to a course relates to the knowledge
embedded in academic journal articles.
Students also typically do a small research
project as part of their assessment, raising
questions about similarities and differences
between academic and policy-related
research.
What counts as ‘knowledge’?
Knowledge is often defined as the top end of
a hierarchy of knowledge, information, and
data. Information and data can be stored in
files and discs, but it does not become useful
knowledge until it processed in the minds of
individuals and is presented in the form of
words or graphs. Its representation in words
and symbols makes it a collective as well as
an individual phenomenon, defined as
‘justified belief that increases an entity’s
capacity for effective action’ (Alavi and
Leidener 2001:4).
Much of the research on knowledge
management goes back to the distinction
made by the philosopher Michael Polanyi
between ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge
(Polanyi 1962). Tacit knowledge is specific
to a particular context, often unspoken, and
171
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 21 Number 2 2006 © Asia Pacific Press
acquired by trial and error, or watching how
others do it. Explicit knowledge is more
universal, codified, and acquired by formal
education and training. An example of tacit
knowledge is the ability to drive a car.
Explicit knowledge is set out in the car’s
manual or handbook which prescribes when
the oil should be changed. They may be
differently valued. Police dramas on TV often
unfavourably contrast the ‘book learning’ of
desk officers with the well-honed instincts
of their counterparts on the street. John Le
Carre (I think) invented the phrase ‘tradecraft’
to describe the tacit knowledge of spies. Tacit
knowledge may become codified in manuals,
or statements of official doctrine set out in
speeches by chief executives, or annual
reports to the legislature. In the other direction
codified knowledge may become tacitly
understood through training courses, intern-
ships, or apprenticeships. The distinction
applies in all kinds of professional contexts,
including teaching and academic research
(where tacit knowledge may include grants-
manship, and how to get published in the
right journals).
As these examples show the relationship
between tacit and codified knowledge is often
one of power and authority. The official text
often holds an authority that is resisted by
the instinctive wisdom of the street, field and
caseworker. The extreme case is when
knowledge is codified as law. In some cases,
however, ‘street wisdom’ ‘experience’ and
other forms of tacit knowledge may trump
‘fancy qualifications’ and ‘book learning’.
Authority does not always lie with the text.
Both non-government organisations, like
Transparency International, and official anti-
corruption agencies, like the Independent
Commissions Against Corruption, generate
and trade in data, information and
knowledge. So knowledge management
provides a useful framework for comparing
and distinguishing between them. It also
provides a way of bringing academic
researchers, thinktanks and the media into
the picture. It opens up the ‘fourth wall’
dividing the actors on the stage from the
audience—in this case relationships between
the agencies and academics and journalists
watching them perform.
What counts as ‘research’?
Knowledge management also asks about the
role of research—however that is conceived
—and the role of expert witnesses,
consultants and advisers. ICACs, non-
government organisations and academic
departments all claim to be doing different
kinds of research about corruption and anti-
corruption (including research into the
agencies themselves as well as the problems
they deal with). Research may include
assembling material from files, analysing
statistics, making phone calls, searching the
web, looking at press clippings, ringing up
experts, interviewing witnesses and reading
academic journal articles. Some agencies
have specialised departments dealing with
research, and appoint full-time research
officers, while others mainstream the
research in other activities or treat it as
incidental to other work. Different parts of a
single agency—for example the three prongs
of an Independent Commission Against
Corruption—may do different kinds of
research, and conceptualise and value it
differently.
The relationship between academics,
non-government organisations and govern-
ment agencies is often fraught. Transparency
International’s founders speak of an early
awkward encounter with academics. One
describes how they were refused entry to a
meeting of political scientists in Berlin, on
the grounds that nothing practical could be
done about corruption. More recently
academics have started to do research on or
in Transparency International, and aroused
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sensitivities about the organisation’s self-
image, history, ‘dirty linen’ and the degree to
which it should be transparent to outsiders.
Transparency International itself became
divided over the organisation of research,
leading to a split between its founding
fathers, as Jeremy Pope and Fredrik Galtung
left to form the breakaway organisation, Tiri.
Within Transparency International there has
also been a long-running internal debate
about the role and status of individual
members and the National Chapters of the
organisation. It is partly a debate about
knowledge, with the individual members
selected by the founding fathers of
Transparency International for their tacit
knowledge of networks, contacts and ability
to open doors. They tacitly knew who to
speak to and how to get things done.
Knowledge management in anti-
corruption campaigns
The phrase ‘knowledge management’ was
coined in the 1980s, and most of the work has
been on the private sector, and in the context
of Information Technology (Nutley et al. 2004).
Transparency International’s websites are a
major part of its activities, and Hong Kong’s
ICAC website is particularly elaborate and
informative as well as bilingual.
Research on policy transfer has looked
at how knowledge about policy is transferred
between countries. International organisations
like the United Nations or the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) play an important role in formalising
and transferring knowledge. Transparency
International was set up precisely to provide
a non-government counterpart for know-
ledge about corruption. My own research on
policy transfer in the Pacific islands looked
at how the idea of a Leadership Code was
transferred from Africa to Melanesia in the
1970s, at the introduction of Transparency
International chapters in the 1990s, and at
the work of the OECD’s Financial Action Task
Force in pressuring island governments to
adopt new laws against money laundering
(Larmour 2005) in the 2000s. I was particularly
interested in what made transferred policies
‘stick’.
The only work on knowledge
management in anti -corruption I have found
is in a series of stimulating articles and a
working paper by an economist, Bryane
Michael (2004a, 2004b, 2004c and 2006).
These have grown out of, and reflected on,
his work as an academic, trainer and
consultant on donor-sponsored anti-
corruption campaigns. In these papers a wide
range of concepts is rapidly introduced—
sometimes rather falling over each other.
Unusually, Michael has tried to theorise
about (endogenise, in his economic language)
the relationship between theory and practice.
Michael (2004a) notices the rapid diffusion
of anti-corruption programs throughout the
world. The literature on policy diffusion
distinguishes two kinds of process: one
coercive, involving the interests of powerful
players, and resistance to their ideas; the
other more diffuse, in which ideas flow more
readily, and are copied eagerly—perhaps
inappropriately—by their recipients. Michael
argues that both approaches are dealing with
‘knowledge about policies’ but faults them
for not recognising the role of policy
knowledge managers who recognise the
need for tacit as well as codified knowledge,
if the transfer is to succeed.
Michael (2004c) returns to the lessons
purportedly learned from the anti-corruption
projects in Africa. He looks at the anti-
corruption recommendations made by the
participants in the World Bank-sponsored
Anti-Corruption Core course piloted in
several African countries. He scores these for
their specificity, relevance and ‘fit’ with local
thinking, and finds them generally low on
each factor. The programs, he says, seem to
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refer to each other, rather than specific, local
circumstances. However he commends a
project involving Nigerian judges for higher
levels of specificity, relevance and fit—
though conceding that its effectiveness was
yet to be shown.
Michael’s working paper for the Utstein
group of European aid donors (2006) evaluates
their anti-corruption projects in terms of
whether they based on recipient needs,
consider the environment in which they are
operating and adopt knowledge management
principles—and generally finds them wanting.
Processes of knowledge
management
In their review of the literature on knowledge
management, Alavi and Leidner (2001)
identify four general social processes
• creating knowledge
• storing and retrieving it
• transferring it, and
• applying it (2001:11).
This tends to frame knowledge as something
external, to be manipulated, rather than a
process embodied in particular people, and
their relationships with each other. But it
helps raise questions for non-government
organisations and anti-corruption agencies.
Creating knowledge
Creation can take place within both elements
of Polanyi’s tacit-explicit pair, and by
movement between them. In the latter case
Nonaka (1994) has identified four modes
• socialisation—tacit to tacit (for example,
apprenticeships)
• externalisation—tacit to codified (for
example, best practices)
• internalisation—codified to tacit (for
example, training)
• combination—codified knowledge is
reorganised (for example, literature
review).
An anti-corruption agency, for example, may
have formal training courses, or rely on tacit
socialisation of its new recruits. A non-
government organisation may actively seek
out examples of best practice, or review the
academic literature on corruption and anti-
corruption.
Alavi and Leidner (2001) identify the
following research questions
• what conditions facilitate creation and
sharing?
• what cultural as well as technical issues
are involved in sharing versus hoarding
knowledge?
• do closely-knit networks reduce
opportunities to encounter new ideas?
• how is externally generated information
evaluated for internal use?
• does the absence of shared context
inhibit adoption of outside knowledge?
(2001:21).
Storing/retrieving knowledge
Organisational memory may be systematic,
and explicit, or episodic and context specific.
An official anti-corruption agency may create
a complex filing system. The need to justify
its action, or in inaction, to outsiders, and
the need to present cases to tribunals or
courts may encourage systematic record
keeping. But this stored knowledge may be
hard to understand without knowledge of
the context in which it was created. ‘Old
hands’ may have to be consulted to help make
sense of it.
Organisational memory may be
particularly problematic for a non-government
organisation that relies on volunteers, or short
term contracts of employment. But the internet
has radically reduced the costs of storing and
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retrieving knowledge for non-government
organisations.
Alavi and Leidner’s (2001) research
questions include
• what are the incentives for individuals
to contribute their knowledge to the
organisation? What are the incentives for
secrecy?
• how much contextual information needs
to be stored to make sense of information?
• is stored knowledge accessed by
individuals who don’t know the
originator?
• what mechanisms—push or pull—are
most effective? (2001:22).
Transferring knowledge
Knowledge may be transferred between
individuals, groups and organisations. The
degree of transfer depends on factors such
as the perceived value of source’s knowledge,
the motivational disposition of sources (to
share), and the receiver to learn, and the
existence and richness of channels (formal
and informal; personal and impersonal,
including new technologies). Aid donors, like
AusAID, and non-government organisations
like Transparency International are now
actively involved in trying to transfer
knowledge about corruption and how to
prevent it (Larmour 2005). Alavi and
Leidner’s (2001) research questions include
• how can knowledge be transferred
effectively between groups?
• how do information technologies help
or hinder (perhaps through sheer
volume)?
• what is the right balancing of pushing
information to individuals or waiting for
them to pull it down?
• when do individuals discontinue using
external sources and rely only on
internal?
Applying knowledge
Knowledge may be applied by directives,
which are rules, standards and procedures
for non-specialists, or by routines that allow
specialists to apply knowledge without
articulating it. It may also be applied by self-
contained task teams. An example of the
former might be rules requiring government
officials to report their suspicions of
corruption to the specialists at the anti-
corruption agency. An example of the latter
might be the requirement that a Corruption
Prevention Specialist be routinely coopted into
any investigatory team. Non-government
organisations may create similar rules and
routines about their own knowledge. Alavi
and Leidner’s (2001) research questions
include
• how can the organisation encourage the
use of available knowledge (against
distrust, lack of time, preference for
routine)?
• what factors contribute to the knowing/
doing gap and how can they be reduced?
Hiding and forgetting knowledge
So far, we have been assuming that
knowledge is a good thing, and that the more
it is shared the better. But organisations also
keep secrets and forget information, in
systematic ways (Thompson and Wildavsky
1986). An anti-corruption agency must keep
certain kinds of secrets. For example, an
investigation may be compromised if officials
know they are being watched and their
conversations recorded. But the agency may
also use secrecy to cover up its mistakes, and
avoid accountability.
Agencies may forget knowledge through
long-term processes of misfiling or through
shifts from paper based to electronic forms
of storage. They may more deliberately forget
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embarrassing knowledge, for example about
their behaviour under a previous director, or
regime. Forgetting may be no bad thing—a
well-established body of knowledge,
institutionalised in a filing system, can blind
an agency to new kinds of challenges.
Investigations—like the current
Australian Cole Commission, which is
looking at the Australian Wheat Board’s
payment of kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq—uncover floods of emails and
telegrams from which they must establish who
knew what and when. In this particular case,
ministers have defended their ignorance by
saying that they, or their staff, cannot be
expected to read everything that comes across
their desk, or that the information produced
by intelligence agencies was ‘unprocessed’
and hence its significance unrecognised. It
seems they did not want to know.
There may also be a trade-off between
knowledge and effective action. Organisations
have to decide at what point they know
enough to charge an official, or take a case to
court or a tribunal. Senior officials may feel
they are overloaded with information. They
will not read beyond the first few paragraphs
of a report, or demand an ‘executive summary’,
or prefer verbal to written briefings.
Secrecy is an issue for anti-corruption
non-government organisations in a different
way, and awkward for an organisation with
‘transparency’ in its name. Transparency
International was set up precisely to expose
the ‘open secret’ of corruption in inter-
national business transactions. Everyone
knew in a tacit, sotto voce, informal way that
corruption was going on in international
business. But no one talked about it in the
formal sessions of meetings of international
organisations, or wrote about it in their
reports. Transparency International thus
brought it out into the open, able to be
codified, quantified, and made the subject of
consultancy reports and feasibility studies.
Whether this is increased official talk leads
to action is another question, which can be
asked of much other official talk.
Truth and falsity
So far we have treated ‘knowledge’ in a
neutral, inclusive, sociological way—we
have not asked if it was true or not, merely if
it carried authority, or credibility. We know,
for example, that bodies of professional
knowledge—for example in medicine or
physics—that were once regarded as true,
are now regarded as false. Thomas Kuhn’s
famous book on The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962) describes the process of
paradigm shifts between periods of normal
science. Similar paradigm shifts must have
gone on in the bodies of professional and
academic knowledge associated with
corruption. The rise in economic thinking
about corruption is one example. The medical
profession has initiated a process of self-
reflection on the empirical foundations of its
doctrines in the movement for ‘evidence based
policymaking’ (Nutley et al. 2002). A similar
process may be overdue in the anti-corruption
industry, among anti-corruption agencies as
well as non-government organisations.
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